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Attitudes toward the Market and Political 
Participation in the Postcommunist States 
David S. Mason 
In the aftermath of the anti-communist revolutions of 1989-1991, the 
new governments in eastern Europe faced the herculean task of at-
tempting simultaneously to build market economies and democratic 
political institutions_ Though capitalism and democracy are often con-
sidered to be natural allies, in the cases of these new states they some-
times pull against each other. The costs of the economic transition, in 
terms of growing unemployment, inequality and inflation, may erode 
support for the new governments and lead to calls for a "strong" gov-
ernment or leadership to cope with economic dislocations_ To a large 
extent, the success of economic transitions is dependent on the con-
tinuing popularity and legitimacy of the new governments. Democratic 
legitimacy and stability can probably be maintained only if the gov-
ernments remain broadly responsive to and representative of the pop-
ulations-or at least be perceived as such. In eastern Europe the new 
governments seem to have established their democratic credentials 
through their popular overthrow of the communist regimes and 
through widespread support for new parties and regimes in early 
rounds of parliamentary elections. However, a close look at the back-
grounds and attitudes of the politically active in these countries raises 
some questions about how closely they represent the rest of the pop-
ulation, particularly in terms of their attitudes towards the market and 
towards socialist principles. 
This study is part of the International Social justice Project (ISjP), a collaborative 
international survey research effort, which was supported in whole or in part by each 
of the following organizations: the National Council for Soviet and East European 
Research; the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX); the National Sci-
ence Foundation; the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan; OTKA 
(National Scientific Research Fund; Hungary); the Economic and Social Research 
Council (UK); the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Germany); Institute of Social 
Science, Chuo University (japan); the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs; the Bulgarian 
Academy of Sciences; the Grant Agency of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences; 
Saar Poll, Limited (Estonia); the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic 
of Slovenia; the State Committee for Scientific Research (Komitet Badan Naukowych, 
Poland); and the Russian Federation Ministry of Labor. 
The principal investigators in the development of these data were as follows: Galin 
Gornev (Bulgaria), Petr Mateju (the Czech Republic), Andrus Saar (Estonia), Bernd 
Wegener (Ger~_any), Gordon Marshall, Adam Swift and Carole Burgoyne (UK), Gyorgy 
Csepeli, Antal Orkeny, Tamas Kolosi and Maria Nemenyi (Hungary), Masaru Miyano 
and Akihiro Ishikawa (japan), Wil Arts and Piet Hermkens (Holland), Bogdan Cich-
omski and Witold Morawski (Poland), Ludmila Khakhulina and Svetlana Sydorenko 
(Russia), Vojko AntonCic (Slovenia), and Duane Alwin,james Kluegel and David Mason 
(USA). 
Extensive analysis of the results of this survey are provided in james R. Kluegel, 
David S. Mason and Bernd Wegener, eds., Social Justice and Political Change: Public opin· 
ion in Capitalist and Post-Communist States (Hawthorne: Aldine deGruyter Press, forth-
coming). 
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Participation and representativeness are important aspects of dem-
ocratic politics in established democracies and probably even more so 
in fledgling ones. In his classic theoretical work on Polyarchy, Robert 
Dahl emphasizes that all full citizens must have unimpaired opportun-
ities to "signify their preferences" through individual and collective 
action. l And empirical studies of both the US and other western de-
mocracies have stressed the importance for democracy of the avail-
ability of channels for political activity and the extent to which such 
channels are differentially available and used across social groupS.2 If 
democracy is to work properly, people from all socio-economic groups 
and all political orientations should have the opportunity, at least, to 
participate in the political process. 
This paper will explore this issue in the postcommunist states by 
examining the level and sources of support for the market-oriented 
reforms in east central Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the 
relationship between these attitudes and the populations' political ori-
entations and participation. Numerous recent studies have examined 
popular support for either democracy or the market in these states;3 
most of these, however, have been single-country studies. With some 
exceptions (e.g. Rose; McIntosh et al.), none have compared such atti-
tudes across countries and fewer still have compared attitudes in the 
postcommunist states with those in western countries. And few have 
attempted, as I shall, to link economic values with political participa-
tion.4 
1. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale Uni· 
versity Press, 1971), 2-3. 
2. Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase et aI., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five 
Western Democracies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979); Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie andJae· 
on Kim, Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison (Chicago: Univer· 
sity of Chicago Press, 1978), 1-2. 
3. For example, Robert D. Grey, Lauri A. Jennish and A.S. Tyler, "Soviet Public 
Opinion and the Gorbachev Reforms," Slavic Review 49, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 261-
71; David Mason and Svetlana Sydorenko, "Perestroyka, Social Justice, and Soviet 
Public Opinion," Problems of Communism 39, no. 6 (November·December 1990):34-43; 
Robert J. Shiller, Maxim Boycko and Vladimir Korobov, "Popular Attitudes Toward 
Free Markets: the Soviet Union and the United States Compared," American Economic 
Review 81 (1991): 385-400; Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political 
System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," American Political Science 
Review 86 (December 1992): 857-74; Lynn D. Nelson, Lilia V. Babaeva and Rufat O. 
Babaev, "Perspectives on Entrepreneurship and Privatization in Russia: Policy and 
Public Opinion," Slavic Review 51 (Summer 1992): 271-86; James L. Gibson, Raymond 
M. Duch and Kent L. Tedin, "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet 
Union," The Journal of Politics 54, no. 2 (May 1992): 329-71; Richard Rose and Christian 
Haerpfer, "Adapting to Transformation in Eastern Europe: New Democracies Barom· 
eter-II," Studies in Public Policy, no. 212 (University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1993); 
Richard Rose and William T.E. Mishler, "Reacting to Regime Change in Eastern Eu· 
rope: Polarization or Leaders and Laggards," Studies in Public Policy, no. 210 (University 
of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 1993); Mary E. McIntosh, Martha Abele MacIver, Daniel G. 
Abele and Dina Smeltz, "Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and East Europe, 
1991-1993," Slavic Review 53 (Summer 1994): 483-512. 
4. For some exceptions, see Shiller, Boycko and Korobov;James L. Gibson, "Po· 
litical and Economic Markets: Connecting Attitudes toward Political Democracy and 
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The present analysis is based on data collected by the International 
Social Justice Project (ISJP), a large-scale, common public opinion sur-
vey on social, economic and political justice implemented in 1991 in 
twelve countries: Russia, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech-
oslovakia, Estonia,5 Germany (former East and West), Holland, the UK, 
Japan and the US.6 The focus of this paper will be on the postcom-
munist states, though comparisons will be made between them and the 
capitalist democratic states. In all of these countries, the survey was 
conducted in mid-1991, which was a period of considerable political 
and economic flux, and even of turmoil, in the postcommunist states, 
with dramatic declines in GNP and industrial production, high rates 
of inflation and rapid increases in unemployment. 
I shall begin by looking at popular attitudes in the postcommunist 
states towards the market and towards socialism, and towards partic-
ular elements of socialist ideology, since all of these are central issues 
in the transition processes and political arenas in these countries. I 
shall then consider the scope and determinants of political participa-
tion in the postcommunist states, and the relationship of pro- and anti-
socialist values to political participation. Finally, I shall look at more 
recent evidence in Poland to explore possible trends, and as a potential 
explanation for the resurgence of the left in Poland and elsewhere in 
the second and third rounds of parliamentary elections in the region. 
Attitudes towards Socialism and the Market 
In the aftermath of the democratic revolutions of 1989, citizens in 
the postcommunist states demonstrated a remarkable ambivalence to-
wards the theory and practice of socialism. Having just overturned the 
communist system, with its authoritarianism, centralization and inef-
ficiencies, most people were hostile to the idea, at least, of socialism. 
When asked about their views on socialism, fewer than a quarter of 
respondents in each of eight postcommunist states expressed support 
for that path, while the overwhelming majority in each country agreed 
with the statement that "a free market economy is essential to our 
economic development" (see tables 1 and 2). Such substantial support 
for a new course in the economic sphere would seem to have boded 
a Market Economy within the Mass Culture of the USSR," paper presented at the 1993 
Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Stud· 
ies, Honolulu; Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger, "Comparing 
Citizen and Elite Attitudes towards a Market Economy in Russia, Ukraine and Lithu· 
ania," paper presented at the 1993 annual convention of the American Association 
for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Honolulu. 
5. As Estoniajoined the project late, the survey was fielded there in spring 1992. 
6. In this project, national teams in each of the twelve countries were responsible 
for obtaining a probability sample of the adult population, the cross·validation of the 
measuring instrument and the implementation of a national survey with a target 
sample of 1500 respondents in each country. More detailed information can be found 
in Duane Alwin, David Klingel and Merilynn Dielman, International Social Justice Project: 
Documentation and Codebook (Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1993). 
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Table 1 
Views about Socialism, by Country 
(% of respondents) 
Neither 
Very much Somewhat for nor Somewhat Totally 
Country in favor in favor against against against N 
Bulgaria 8.1 16.1 24.2 19.2 32.4 1286 
Czechoslovakia 2.4 12.4 34.8 24.1 26.3 1119 
East Germany 1.6 16.6 39.2 27.6 14.9 986 
Estonia 2.3 18.5 26.1 18.2 35.0 875 
Poland 1.8 9.2 43.2 20.2 25.7 1418 
Russia 9.6 17.0 29.7 21.4 22.2 1385 
Slovenia 4.8 16.2 46.0 15.5 17.5 1249 
Question: People have different views about socialism. Based on your experience in 
(country name) of socialism, would you say that you are very much in favor, somewhat 
in favor, neither for nor against, somewhat against, or totally against socialism? 
well for the transformational policies of the new governments in these 
countries. 
Once one gets away from the ideologically loaded terms of "so-
cialism" and "market," however, this seeming consensus begins to dis· 
appear. When respondents were asked more specific questions they 
tended to support important policies and values associated with the 
state socialist regimes they had left behind. This is perhaps most evi-
dent in widespread egalitarianism, support for a strong role for the 
government in the economy and deep skepticism about a distributive 
system based more on merit than on need. 
The radical egalitarianism of early communism in the Soviet Union 
was soon replaced by a more meritocratic ideology and incentive sys-
tem in the Stalin period, in both Russia and eastern Europe. Never-
theless, there remained a strong egalitarianism in the communist ide-
Table 2 
Support for a Market Economy 
(% of respondents) 
Neither 
Strongly Somewhat agree not Somewhat Strongly 
Country agree Agree disagree disagree disagree N 
Bulgaria 44.0 24.7 14.1 10.7 6.6 1229 
Czechoslovakia 51.8 31.1 11.9 4.0 l.3 1087 
Estonia 40.9 32.1 18.8 5.0 3.1 897 
Poland 26.5 46.0 15.3 8.0 4.1 1343 
Russia 36.0 34.5 9.2 11.3 9.0 1283 
Slovenia 73.7 20.7 4.3 1.0 0.3 1287 
Question: Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
A free market economy is essential to our economic development. 
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ology, and both wages and incomes were less highly differentiated in 
the communist countries than in western capitalist ones.7 Surveys con· 
ducted in east Europe, and especially in Poland, before 1989 showed 
a high degree of social and economic egalitarianism in the popula· 
tions.8 
As the east European countries move towards free enterprise and 
the market, economic inequality will grow sharply as the governments 
relax restrictions on wages and wealth, and abandon their commitment 
to full employment. A major task of the new governments is to con· 
vince their populations to accept greater economic inequality in their 
societies. This may be difficult, given the prevailing attitudes. When 
asked about the differences in incomes in their countries, the overwhelm· 
ing majority in each of the east European states asserted that such 
differences are too large. Preferred income differences are much less in 
the postcommunist states than in the developed capitalist countries. 
Respondents in the survey were asked to postulate a '~ust and fair" 
income for the managing director of a large corporation and for an 
unskilled factory worker. In the eight postcommunist states (including 
the eastern part of Germany), the average ratios between these two 
salaries (the first divided by the second) were uniformly smaller than 
in capitalist states. The median postulated income differential in the 
capitalist states was 4.0 (the higher income should be 4 times larger 
than the smaller), compared to just 2.5 in the postcommunist ones. 
While most people did not favor total income equality, many did. 
When asked about the fairest way of distributing wealth and income, 
20-30 percent in each country (except Estonia) favored giving every· 
one equal shares. These figures may seem high for such a radically 
egalitarian position but the level of support for this position was sim· 
ilar to that of capitalist states. What postcommunist populations do 
favor is guaranteed jobs and, to a lesser extent, ceilings on income, 
imposed by government: a solution not too different than that which 
prevailed under the communist regimes. The preference for guaran· 
teed jobs was overwhelming, with from 56 to 84 percent strongly agree· 
ing that "the government should provide ajob for everyone who wants 
one." Smaller but still sizeable percentages in each country agreed 
(strongly or somewhat) that "the government should place an upper 
limit on the amount of money anyone person can make." As I shall 
show below, this reflects a strong preference in the east European states 
for governmental solutions to economic and social problems. 
This strand of economic egalitarianism is linked to a popular con· 
ception of justice that calls for rewards to be distributed on the basis 
of need as much as (or more than) merit or desert. This seems to be 
at least partly a legacy of the communist period, when the state guar· 
7. See, for example, Abram Bergson, Planning and Performance in Socialist Economies: 
The USSR and Eastern Europe (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
8. For data on Poland, see David S. Mason, Public Opinion and Political Change in 
Poland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985),62-66. 
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anteed jobs and provided a whole host of entitlements, including na-
tional minimum wages and retirement benefits, heavy subsidies of food, 
housing, utilities and vacations, generous maternity leaves and so on_ 
While many east Europeans complained about shortages of consumer 
goods and a standard of living lower than that in the west, they also 
became accustomed to benefits provided by the state_ 
This concern about peoples' needs is indicated by substantial agree-
ment with the proposition that "people [should] get what they need, 
even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more 
than they need_" A majority or a plurality of respondents in all the 
east European countries (except Bulgaria) agreed (strongly or some-
what) with this proposition. People with lower incomes were somewhat 
more likely to agree with this statement but support for the principle 
remained substantial across income groups in most cases. In Poland, 
for example, 66 percent of respondents in the lowest income quartile 
agree, and so do 48 percent of those in the top quartile. 
This emphasis on need over merit is also evident in another ques-
tion on which factors should influence the level of pay for an em-
ployee. When asked about "the size of the family the employee sup-
ports," a clear majority of respondents in every postcommunist country 
(except Czechoslovakia) felt that this should have "a great deal" or 
"some" influence in determining salary. The average level of support 
for this proposition was 57 percent in the former communist countries, 
compared to 48 percent in the developed capitalist countries. The 
highest level of support for this proposition, however, came from west-
ern Germany (73%). As I shall show, attitudes and values in the east 
European countries often are closer to those in western Germany, with 
its "social market" system, than to the other capitalist states.9 
With their revolutions, the east European countries left behind 
systems in which state and party dominated the economies and most 
other aspects of those societies. The state provided jobs and housing, 
set prices and wages, owned industries, schools and farms (in most 
countries), and subsidized basic necessities. The omnipresence and 
omnipotence of the state aggravated many people and contributed to 
revolutionary ferment. But many people also came to rely on the ben-
efits provided by the state: under the communist systems, they may not 
have had freedom or affluence, but they did have basic economic se-
curity. The current reforms promise to deliver the former but threaten 
the latter. 
Our survey asked three questions on the role of the government 
in the economy: whether the government should 1) guarantee everyone 
a minimum standard of living, 2) place upper limits on income and 3) 
provide a job for everyone who wants one. On all three questions, 
there was affirmative response in all of the postcommunist countries; 
9. In another survey in which people in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia 
were asked what sort of society they would like their country to emulate, the majority 
named Germany or Sweden. The US ranked third, with an average of 18% (Richard 
Rose, "Toward a Civil Economy," Journal of Democracy 3, no. 2 [April 1992]: 16). 
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Table 3 
Support for a Strong Role for the Government in the Economy 
(% strongly or somewhat agreeing) 
Principle Statism 
Minimum standard Upper limits Guaranteed Index 
Country of living on money Jobs (Rank)* 
Bulgaria 93 42 87 4 
Eastern Germany 94 60 96 1 
Hungary 90 58 87 2 
Poland 87 47 88 5 
Russia 88 34 96 6 
Slovenia 92 60 88 3 
Czechoslovakia 88 30 82 9 
Estonia 94 32 76 8 
Average for Post-
communist States 91 45 88 
Western Germany 85 32 71 lO 
Japan 83 36 86 7 
Holland 86 32 53 12 
Great Britain 83 39 67 11 
United States 56 17 50 13 
Average for 
Capitalist States 79 31 65 
Questions: Five point agree/disagree scale on following statements: 1) the government 
should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living; 2) the government should 
place an upper limit on the amount of money anyone person may make; 3) the 
government should provide a job for everyone who ,wants one. 
* The statism index is the mean score on these three questions, at the individual level, 
averaged by country. Countries are ranked by support for these statist principles. 
and for the issues of guaranteed jobs and standard of living, it was 
almost universal (see table 3). As is evident from the table, there was 
substantial support for these principles from the capitalist countries 
as well. But respondents in the east European countries were, overall, 
much more supportive of this strong government role than were those 
in the western countries. Americans, it should be noted, were much less 
supportive of strong government than any other country in this sam-
ple. 
On all three orientations, equality, need and role of the state, east 
central Europeans generally lean toward a more egalitarian and statist 
system than do those in west Europe, Japan or the US. To make more 
systematic cross-national comparisons and to allow a more systematic 
examination of the determinants of these attitudes, a single summary 
measure of pro·socialist orientations was derived from six attitudinal 
questions from the survey, including the questions discussed above. lO 
lO. The variables in this index are listed in figure 2. The index was created by 
averaging the z scores of these six variables (since some of them used 5-point scales 
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Figure 1. Support for socialist principles by country. 
US 
Holland 
UK 
W.Germany 
Czechoslovakia 
Estonia 
Bulgaria 
Russia 
Poland 
Japan 
Slovenia 
E.Germany 
Hungary 
o 0.2 
~ 
0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 
Socialist Principles Index 
1.4 
Note: Highest numbers indicate strongest support for socialist principles. Index is 
based on the average of z·scores of responses on six questions tapping support for 
socialist principles (all 4· or 5·point Likert scales): 
-level of pay for an employee should be based on "the size of the family the 
employee supports" 
-"the government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living" 
-"the government should place an upper limit on the amount of money anyone 
person may make" 
-"the government should provide ajob for everyone who wants one" 
-"the fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone 
equal shares" 
-"the most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this means 
allocating money from those who have earned more than they need" 
Pairwise differences of .13 or more are significant at the .01 level (Scheffe criterion). 
The average scores on this index, by country, are indicated in figure 
l. The absolute value of this index is not in itself very meaningful. 
What is notable here is the ranking of the countries. As before, the 
postcommunist countries score higher in socialist orientations than do 
and some of them 4·point) and then subtracting that number from 1 in order to make 
high numbers indicate positive support for socialist principles. The items on this scale 
were entered into a principle components factor analysis and all items were found to 
load on only one factor, providing evidence of a unidimensional scale. Using the SPSS 
"reliability" procedure, the items in the index produced a reliability coefficient (Cron· 
bach's Alpha) of .63. 
It should be noted that this "socialist principles" index does not include variables 
tapping support for state ownership of property or industry, an important component 
of socialism. While such questions were originally included in pretest versions of our 
questionnaire and were asked in some of our countries, they were excluded from the 
common core of questions in the cross·national survey. Thus, this index taps sentiment 
toward important elements of socialism but does not include all dimensions of that 
concept. 
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the capitalist countries;ll the only exception to this division is Japan, 
which is closer to the postcommunist states than to the western capi-
talist ones. On this scale, as on others mentioned above, the US is a 
distant outlier. Values and attitudes in the east European countries are 
much closer to those in west Europe (especially Germany) and Japan 
than they are to those in the US. In that case, the west European and 
Japanese models of economic and social development, involving a 
greater emphasis on community and government activism, might be 
more appropriate for postcommunist states than the more individu-
alistic and laissez-faire approach in the US. 12 
So far I have discussed only national averages of attitudes towards 
issues relevant to economic reforms. But in assessing the likely success 
of market-oriented reforms in east central Europe, it is necessary to 
consider who it is that supports and opposes these reforms. It would 
be helpful for market-oriented governments, of course, if a majority 
of the population supported the kinds of policies they are imple-
menting. As we have seen above, however, that is not likely to be the 
case: most people in the postcommunist states still have a basically 
egalitarian and statist orientation that works against the laissez-faire 
and decentralizing reforms being implemented in the region. But even 
in the absence of a consensus behind the reforms, the governments 
might be able to push through the reforms if the proponents of the 
reforms were to remain politically active and the opponents were not. 
In all of the east European countries except Estonia, the strongest 
determinant by far of pro-socialist attitudes is education (see table 4). 
In most countries, income and sex are the next most important. Those 
with low education and incomes, and women are more supportive of 
socialist principles than others. Figure 2 shows a. steady decline in 
support for socialist principles from those with low education to those 
with higher educations. Across all the east European countries, the 
correlation coefficient between the socialism index and educational 
level is - .33. 
The strong negative relationship between education and support 
for socialism is not surprising and, in fact, prevails in the western 
countries as well (r=-.19). In the postcommunist countries, however, 
it is particularly strong and reflects a real and perplexing division 
within those societies. The governments there are pursuing non-egal-
itarian reforms and are supported in that effort by the more highly 
educated minority in those societies, who, as it happens, also have the 
11. These differences are significant at the .01 level (Scheffe criterion) for most 
pairs of capitalist/postcommunist states. See the note to figure 1. 
12. Similarly, James Gibson reports from a 1992 survey in the former Soviet 
Union that "the sort of market supported by most Soviet people is a far more benign 
and controlled market than is often thought of in the West (especially in the United 
States)" ("Political and Economic Markets: Connecting Attitudes toward Political De-
mocracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of the USSR," paper pre-
sented at the 1993 annual convention of the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Slavic Studies, Honolulu, 40). 
Country 
Bulgaria 
E. Germany 
Hungary 
Poland 
Russia 
Slovenia 
Czechoslovakia 
Estonia 
Postcommunist 
States 
Capitalist 
States 
Table 4 
Multiple Regression Analysis of Index of Socialist Values 
(standardized regression coefficients-beta) 
Social 
Education Income Sex Status Age 
-.28*** -.10** .12*** -.10*** .04 
-.18*** -.07* .05 -.06 .05 
-.36*** -.08* .06 -.09** -.03 
-.35*** -.14*** .06** -.08** -.04 
-.15*** -.12*** .12*** -.02 .06* 
-.30*** -.13*** .09** -.03 -.05 
-.31*** -.05 .11 *** -.09** .04 
-.10** -.14*** .06 -.12** .02 
-.27*** -.11*** .08*** .08*** .01 
-.12*** -.15*** .09*** -.12*** -.07*** 
Listwise 
R2 N 
.16 1182 
.07 950 
.20 935 
.21 1496 
.09 1347 
.15 1179 
.16 1111 
.08 794 
.14 9001 
.09 5734 
Variables: Education (based on Casmin categories); income: family income in 20·tiles; social status-self·perceived; sex (male= 1; 
female=2). 
* p < .05 
** P < .01 
*** P < .001 
R2 is significant at .001 level for all countries. 
(.)0 
c.o 
*"-
VJ § 
.... 
C"') 
~ 
~ 
~. 
t: 
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Figure 2. Support for socialist principles by educational level. 
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"iii 
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::l 
Cf) 
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Level of Education 
1_ High Support _ Medium Support II Low Support 
Note: Data based on pooled sample from all of the postcommunist states in our sample. 
most to gain from such reforms. Indeed, in many of these countries, 
the new governments are dominated by the highly educated, because 
the revolutioris swept into power intellectuals who had previously op-
posed the communist system. 
In the east European countries as elsewhere, education is related 
to income, so support for socialist principles is also related to income 
(r= - .23). In Poland, for example, 58 percent of those in the bottom 
quartile of family incomes score high in support for socialist princi-
ples, while among those in the upper quartile, only 24 percent do. 
Thus we see what could be a politically dangerous situation in the 
postcommunist countries: governments and relatively small educated 
elites favor implementation of market-based economies and more mer-
itocratic societies, while most of the poor and less educated popula-
tions, who will most directly feel the bite of these reforms, remain 
supportive of many of the social and economic principles of the old 
regimes. While other studies have shown that most people in postcom-
munist countries are committed to the democratic aspects of the reform 
process, there are sharp divisions over the economic ones.13 
Economic Values and Political Participation 
It may seem paradoxical that there should be such divisions be-
tween leaders and led in societies that have just undergone paroxysms 
13. In his 1992 survey in the former Soviet Union, Gibson also found stronger 
support for a democratic culture than for a market·based economic one ("Political 
And Economic Markets"). For evidence of support for democratic principles, see also 
Finifter and Mickiewicz; and Rose and Haerpfer. 
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of revolution, participation and democratization. In East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, hundreds of thousands of people par· 
ticipated in demonstrations that brought down the communist govern· 
ments and voter turnout was high in the first competitive elections in 
each of these countries. But on closer examination, it is clear that 
political activity in east European countries remained limited, even 
during the revolutionary ferment. Most people in all countries voted 
in the early elections but were not otherwise active politically in even 
a minimal way. Our survey asked respondents if they had ever partic-
ipated in any of ten variants of political action, ranging from writing 
to a newspaper or signing a petition to joining a wildcat strike or 
blocking traffic (all questions used in the Political Action study).14 Table 
5 shows wide variation across countries, with the incidence of protest 
high in those countries where the governments were brought down by 
people power (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria) and low where 
14. Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, et aI., Political Action: Mass Participation in Five 
Western Democracies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979). See the note to table 5 for the question 
wording and the ten forms of protest. 
Table 5 
Political Action by Country 
(% in each country reporting protest activities) 
Number of Protest Activities 
Country None 1-3 4-10 
Eastern Germany 17 66 17 
Czechoslovakia 34 49 17 
Bulgaria 48 43 9 
Slovenia 66 29 5 
Russia 67 29 4 
Estonia 69 28 3 
Poland 72 23 5 
Hungary 84 15 1 
Average for Post-
communist States 57 35 8 
Western Germany 31 52 18 
Holland 28 55 17 
United Kingdom 21 64 15 
United States 10 55 35 
Japan 40 53 7 
Average for 
Capitalist States 26 56 18 
N 
1019 
1181 
1405 
1375 
1734 
1000 
1542 
1000 
1837 
1783 
1319 
1414 
777 
Questions: ... have you ever done any of these things over an issue that was important 
to you: signed a petition; joined a boycott; attended a protest demonstration or rally; 
attended a public meeting; joined in an unofficial (wildcat) strike; blocked traffic; 
written to a newspaper; written to your (member of the national/federal legislature); 
refused to pay rent, rates or taxes; occupied a building or property in protest. 
Note: all percentages are rounded. 
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the transition was more evolutionary (Poland) or managed by the po-
litical elite (Hungary). But what is remarkable here is the lack of po-
litical activity of any kind in most of these countries: in the pooled 
sample, 58 percent of those in the postcommunist states had partici-
pated in none of ten forms of political action, compared with just 25 
percent reporting such low levels of political activity in the capitalist 
states. 15 These questions asked about such activity over lifetimes, so it 
is apparent that these people were politically inactive both in the com-
munist era, when the regimes encouraged formal political participa-
tion, and in the revolutionary era, when thousands of people took to 
the streets in demonstrations, protests and rallies. In all of the postcom-
munist states, most people (three quarters or more) voted in the first 
free or semi-free parliamentary elections in 1989-1991 but, apart from 
that, there was very little political activity. 
In most of the postcommunist states, less than a third of the re-
spondents expressed even minimal political interest through "sympa-
thizing with a particular [political] party." Only in eastern Germany, 
which had by this time been integrated into the fully formed political 
structure of the west, did a majority of respondents (53%) express such 
affiliation. In part, this reluctance to identify with political parties was 
due to the weak structure and development of party systems through-
out the region. In both Poland and Hungary, for example, there were 
dozens of political parties and groups vying for parliamentary office, 
including the semi-serious Beer Lovers Party in Poland. This may have 
been bewildering to many potential voters, but the lack of effective 
party organizations effectively excluded much of the population from 
political participation and influence. 
In the US and other western countries, socio-economic status, and 
especially education, is the most important determinant of voting and 
other forms of political participation.16 In the postcommunist states, 
our survey also showed a linear relationship between educational level 
and both voting and political activity. In the capitalist countries in our 
survey, regression analysis showed education to be by far the most 
important determinant of political action (see table 6). In the postcom-
munist states, education was also important but the major determinant 
of political action was past personal experience of political injustice. 
The variable "experienced injustice for political beliefs" (table 6) 
is derived from a series of questions in our survey about injustice in 
people's lives and asked respondents "how often have you personally 
experienced injustice because of the following factors," including "your 
political beliefs." Questions about injustice "in their lives" should have 
tapped past experiences (i.e., during the communist period) as well as 
present-day ones. In each of the postcommunist states, two thirds or 
15. The Political Action study found similarly low levels of political inactivity in 
five western countries (Barnes and Kaase, 550). 
16. Robert Erikson, Norman Luttbeg and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion: 
Its Origins, Content and Impact, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1991),8-9. 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Political Action in Capitalist and Postcommunist 
States 
(standardized regression coefficients-beta) 
Independent Variable 
Experienced injustice for political beliefs 
Education 
Age 
Gender (1 =male; 2=female) 
'Self-perceived social standing 
Satisfaction with life overall 
Overall experience of injustice+ 
Satisfaction with income 
Household income (in 20-tiles) 
R2 
Listwise N 
* p < _05 
** P < _01 
*** P < _001 
Post-
communist 
states 
_21 *** 
_16*** 
-_11*** 
-_07*** 
_06*** 
_05*** 
_09** 
-_03* 
_02 
_16*** 
8438 
Capitalist 
_09*** 
_29*** 
-_02 
-_06*** 
_03* 
_04*** 
_12*** 
-_07*** 
_06*** 
_15*** 
5562 
+ Overall experience of injustice is the mean score on a series of eight questions 
asking if respondents had ever experienced injustice because of their religious beliefs, 
sex, social background, age, lack of money, part of country they were from, political 
beliefs, or race or ethnic group_ 
more said they had "rarely" or "never" experienced political injustice. 
But as is evident from Table 6, such experience was an important 
determinant of political action in postcommunist states: overall almost 
two thirds of those who had experienced injustice were highly politi-
cally active, compared to about one third of those who had not expe-
rienced injustice. 
This relationship worked in the other direction as well, in that the 
politically active were much more likely to have experienced injustice 
than the politically inactive (40% compared to 17%). Thus, the rela-
tively small proportion of the population that felt politically persecuted 
were disproportionately active in politics. The vast majority of the 
populations in postcommunist states, on the other hand, were more 
concerned with economic issues and economic injustice than with pol-
itics, and were not so politically activeP 
Political participation translates into political influence. Studies in 
the US and other western countries have shown that the economically 
advantaged groups in society tend to be more politically active and 
17. In "Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika," Donna 
Bahry has shown that in the Brezhnev-era Soviet Union, "People with higher status 
and more material benefits ranked among the most discontented," Slavic Review 52 
(Fall 1993): 517. 
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that the well-off therefore "tend to benefit more from governmental 
policies because they have greater influence on such policies_" 18 In the 
emerging democracies of eastern Europe, it is also the case that polit-
ical participation is disproportionately exercised by those in higher 
socio-economic categories and by those who have experienced political 
injustice more than economic deprivation_ Perhaps this is not surpris-
ing in that the revolutions of 1989 (like most revolutions) were led by 
intellectuals and other dissidents who were the main targets of political 
repression under communism_ But if these are also the people who 
are leading the political and economic transitions in these societies, 
as seems to be the case, their interests, needs and political !lgendas are 
likely to be quite different from those of the populations as a whole_ 
What Sidney Verba and his colleagues say about the US also has rel-
evance in the emerging democracies of eastern Europe: "If those who 
take part and those who do not were similar on all politically relevant 
dimensions, then substantial inequalities in participation would pose 
no threat to the democratic principles of equal protection of interests_ 
As our analysis has demonstrated, this is hardly the case_" 19 
While studies of the US by Verba and others have found significant 
demographic differences between those who are politically active and 
those who are not, they have usually found minimal differences in the 
political attitudes of the two groups_ In the postcommunist states, on 
the other hand, the demographic differences are reinforced by signif-
icant attitudinal differences in areas important in the transitions_ Those 
people who were more active, for example, tended to be less supportive 
of socialist principles_ In every east European country, the level of 
support for socialist principles declined as the level of political activity 
increased (see figure 3) and, correspondingly, those high on our so-
cialist principles index were much less likely (33%) to be politically 
active than those low on the index (54%)_20 This supports the evidence 
above that the more politically active and involved were more com-
mitted to market-oriented reforms than the less active, and less sup-
portive of socialism and socialist principles_21 
18_ Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie andJae-on Kim, Participation and Political Equal-
ity: A Seven Nation Comparison (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 5; and, for 
example, Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady and Norman H. Nie, 
"Citizen Activity: Who Participates? What Do They Say?" American Political Science Re-
view 87, no. 2 (June 1993): 303-18. 
19. Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie, 314. 
20. The same relationship holds for the direct question on support for socialism, 
"based on your experience in [country name] of socialism." The percentage of those 
somewhat or totally against socialism rises from 39% of those with no political activity 
to 51 % of those with minimal activity to 62% of those reporting substantial activity 
(4 or more types of political action). 
21. While the present study compares the values of the politically active with the 
politically inactive, Arthur Miller and his colleagues compared the values of political 
elites with those of the general population (in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania) and 
found marked differences in the levels of support for the market between the two 
groups ("Comparing Citizen and Elite Attitudes"). 
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Figure 3. Support for socialist principles by level of political 
activity. 
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The political action measure used above refers to all past political 
behavior but may not necessarily reflect current political behavior in 
the more normal environment of democratic politics. The findings 
above, however, are confirmed when one looks at voting behavior in 
the early postcommunist elections. Our survey asked respondents if 
they had voted in the last national or parliamentary elections, most of 
which took place in 1990 or 1991. In the postcommunist states as a 
whole, the overwhelming majority (83 %) did vote in those elections. 
But those who were low on our socialist principles index were 
significantly22 more likely to have voted (86%) than those who scored 
high on that index (80 % ).23 Again, this attitudinal difference between 
voters and non·voters is different from patterns in the western coun· 
tries: in our pooled sample of capitalist countries, there was virtually 
no difference in voting behavior between those high and low on the 
socialist principles index. 
In some countries at least, the political withdrawal of pro· socialist 
voters seems to have grown after 1991. The Polish General Social Sur· 
22. Chi square (2 degrees of freedom) = 23.8; P < .00l. 
23. Those identified as "high" on the socialist principles index were those in the 
top third of that index and those "low" were in the bottom third. Some postcommunist 
states had a significantly higher cleavage on this dimension than others. As indicated 
in the text, in the pooled sample of postcommunist states, the difference in voting 
behavior between those high and low on the index was 5.6 percentage points (86.1 %-
80.5%). The individual country differences were as follows: Hungary, 6.9%; Poland, 
6.2%; eastern Germany, 4.3%; Russia, 0.5%; Czechoslovakia, 0.2%. The countries with 
the higher figures are likely to experience more political divisions and instability. 
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Table 7 
Socialist Views and Voting Behavior in Poland, 1989 and 1991 
(% voting by views on socialism) 
Views on socialism 
Very much Somewhat Neither for Somewhat Totally 
% voting in favor in favor nor against against against N 
1989 76.0 76.9 75.2 79.8 80.7 1099 
1991 52.5 52.4 49.8 59.4 69.1 1457 
Sources: 1989 voting behavior from 1991 ISJP survey asking about vote in last parlia· 
mentary elections; 1991 data from 1992 Polish General Social Survey asking about 
vote in October 1991 parliamentary elections. Question on socialism is the same as 
that in table 1. Chi square (4) = 29.4; P < .001. 
vey,24 for example, asked respondents if they had voted in the parlia-
mentary elections of October 1991 (which occurred after our survey). 
There was, of course, a dramatic decline in voter turnout from the 
1989 elections. But there was a much steeper decline among those who 
declared themselves "in favor" of socialism, a question that was also 
asked in the 1991 survey. As is apparent from table 7, there was only 
a four percentage point differential in voting between those strongly 
in favor of socialism and those totally against socialism in 1991. In the 
1992 survey, this difference had widened to almost 17 percentage 
points. 
The political withdrawal of pro-socialist voters contained both good 
news and bad news for the reforming governments in eastern Europe. 
The good news was that the people opposed to or skeptical about 
market-oriented reforms were not likely to express this opposition in 
political action. There was a kind of "silent majority" in the postcom-
munist countries of people who were not committed to the reforms 
but would not speak out or vote against them, thus allowing the refor-
mist governments to pursue the difficult transitional policies without 
substantial opposition. At first, there were few political parties or or-
ganizations in the east European countries which attempted to mobi-
lize this potential opposition. In part this was due to lingering resent-
ment of the communists and a popular suspicion that organized groups 
that opposed the liberalizing reforms must themselves be communists. 
Indeed, there were communist or proto-communist groups or parties 
in each of these countries in 1991, but these were quite small and were 
not always any more pro-socialist than the rest of the population. In 
all three countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Slovenia) where our 
survey asked about former communist party membership, support for 
24. A national representative sample survey of 2000 households conducted in 
May and June 1992 as part of the Polish General Social Survey of 1992 (Bogdan 
Cichomski, Director and Principle Investigator) (Polish General Social Survey, 1992: Code· 
book [Warsaw: Institute for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, 1992]). 
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socialist principles was lower among those reporting such membership 
than among those who said they had never belonged to the communist 
parties. Here, as has been shown by other indicators, potential oppo, 
sition to liberalizing reforms is much broader and deeper in the pop-
ulation than is support for hardline groups. 
The bad news for the reforming governments was the possibility 
that opposition to reforms might become mobilized and politically ac-
tive. Silent majorities could safely be ignored as long as they remained 
silent. But if the transitional period becomes too painful or too long, 
skepticism about the principles of reform will be reinforced by very 
real economic hardship. The combination of these circumstances could 
very well lead to popular upheaval (e.g. strikes or demonstrations) or 
simply to electoral defeat for the reforming governments and the acces-
sion to power of governments committed to reversing the tide of mar-
ketization or even of democratization. We have seen hints of this out-
come already with the strong showing of newly revived postcommunist 
parties in Lithuania, Poland and Hungary, and of antidemocratic forces 
in Russia. 
Reshaping Culture and Ideology 
The evidence above points to some of the social and political ob-
stacles to the transition to market democracies in east central Europe. 
It is unlikely that the governments of the region will be able to work 
against this political culture; either the governments or the culture will 
have to change. Given the overwhelming consensus among both the 
postcommunist political elites and western financial institutions that 
they should push ahead with reforms, the governments will not lightly 
change their market-oriented strategies. What they need to do, in that 
case, is to work on reshaping popular values and political culture. As 
Kent Jennings points out, "if we want to change perceptions of un-
fairness, one fundamental route is to change value systems first-no 
small task." 25 This is normally the task of the political socialization 
process, which often takes a generation or more to effect substantial 
changes in values or culture. But the political culture in eastern Europe 
seems particularly fluid and malleable in this transitional period, so 
perhaps these governments will be able to quickly bring the popula-
tions around to their point of view.26 
There are those who argue that changes in popular orientations 
are already beginning to take place and that a shift in favor of the 
market and capitalism will accelerate as the economic reforms begin 
to improve the economies and deliver jobs, wealth and consumer goods. 
25. M. Kent Jennings, "Thinking about Social Injustice," Political Psychology 12, 
no. 2 (1991): 199. 
26. An analysis of the Hungarian ISJP data finds Hungarians caught between the 
old "solidarity values" and the new "productivity ones" (Gyorgy Csepeli, Tamas Kolosi, 
Maria Nemenyi and Antal Orkeny, "Our Futureless Values: The Forms of Justice and 
Injustice Perception in Hungary in 1991," Social Research 60, no. 4 [Winter 1993]: 892). 
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Indeed, most of the postcommunist states show some shifts away from 
the radical egalitarianism and hostility to private enterprise that char· 
acterized the communist and early postcommunist period. As we have 
seen, however, in 1991, two years after the revolutions in most cases, 
attitudes remained much more egalitarian and statist than in the west· 
ern countries. And in the few cases where questionnaire items from 
our 1991 survey have been replicated subsequently, there does not 
appear to be much overall change in attitudes on key economic and 
political issues. 
In Poland, for example, a survey conducted in mid·1992 and again 
in mid·1993 included a number of questions asked in the 1991 survey.27 
This period was one in which industrial production was beginning to 
recover for the first time since the introduction of shock therapy in 
January 1990 and inflation was beginning to moderate-though un· 
employment was continuing to grow. In this context, one sees a sur· 
prising change in the response to our question (reported in table 1) 
about views about socialism (see table 8). One sees a slight increase 
both in those in favor of socialism and those "somewhat against" it. 
But there is a marked decline in those "totally against" socialism as 
well as an increase in the ambivalent responses of "neither for nor 
against" or "don't know." As noted in our discussion above, "socialism" 
is an ideologically loaded term that evokes hostility from many survi· 
vors of the communist years. But in Poland, at least, much of that 
visceral hostility ("totally against") seems to have evaporated within a 
remarkably short period of time. In this respect, at least, capitalism 
seems not to have won over many adherents, even as it was starting to 
generate some successes. 
27. Polish General Social Surveys, 1992-1993: Cumulative Codebook (Warsaw: Institute 
for Social Studies, University of Warsaw, 1993). 
Table 8 
Views about Socialism in Poland, 1991-1993 
(percentages) 
Response 1991 1992 
Very much in favor l.6 2.7 
Somewhat in favor 8.5 8.6 
Neither for nor against 39.9 45.6 
Somewhat against 18.7 18.7 
Totally against 23.7 15.6 
Don't know 7.6 8.8 
N 1535 1643 
1993 
l.8 
10.4 
5l.9 
15.9 
13.0 
7.0 
1646 
Source note: 1991 figures are from our ISJP data. They differ slighly from those in 
table 1 by including the "don't know" category. 1992 and 1993 figures from Polish 
General Social Surveys, 1992-1993: Cumulative Codebook (Warsaw: Institute for Social Stud· 
ies, University of Warsaw, 1993), 120. 
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On other questions, too, one sees growing concern with the effects 
of the economic reforms. One question asked in the 1991 survey and 
repeated in Poland in 1992 asked about "differences in people's in-
comes in Poland." In 1991 44 percent thought such differences were 
"much too large" and 17 percent thought they were somewhat or much 
too small. In 1992 these figures were 52 percent and 8 percent, re-
spectively, showing substantial increases in those concerned about the 
growing gap between wealthy and poor in Poland. In the 1991 survey 
we had also asked respondents about the role of government in the 
economy, including whether the government should provide a job for 
everyone who wanted one. As seen in table 3, there was overwhelming 
support for this proposition throughout eastern Europe, including 88 
percent of the respondents in Poland. In 1992 the level of overall 
support in Poland for this same proposition was almost identical (89%), 
though there was a substantial dro~ in those who strongly agreed with 
that statement (from 66% to 49%). 8 
Poland was the first country in the region to introduce economic 
"shock therapy" and was the first to begin to recover from the traumas 
of the initial shock. In some ways, then, Poland is a harbinger of the 
course of the transition in many of the other postcommunist states. As 
we have seen, though, attitudes in the country remain egalitarian and 
statist, with much of the population concerned about, and affected by, 
the social and economic dislocations of economic transformation. By 
1992, at least, there do not seem to have been major changes in the 
political culture that would indicate the population becoming more 
accepting of market-oriented changes than they had the previous year. 
The electoral victory of the left in September 1993 certainly reflects 
this continuing popular skepticism towards reforms. It also suggests 
that the "silent majority" on the left had begun to re-enter the political 
arena. 
Favored Futures in East Central Europe 
As one might expect from the above analysis, citizens of postcom-
munist states are divided on what kind of future they favor for their 
countries. In every country but Czechoslovakia, the largest number in 
1991 favored ."a more democratic type of socialism" than either the 
kind of socialism they had had before or a free-market economy (see 
table 9) but in no country did a majority favor any of the four choices 
presented. This is consistent with other surveys which have found that 
people in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia favored emulating Ger-
man or Swedish society more than the US;29 it is also consistent with 
28. There is a similar pattern in Hungary, with the 1992 ISSP survey showing 
three quarters of the population still agreeing with this proposition, but a much smaller 
percentage (50%, compared to 80% in 1991) strongly agreeing. 
29. Richard Rose, "Toward a Civil Economy," Journal of Democracy 3 no. 2 (April 
1992): 13-26. 
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Table 9 
Favored Systems in East Central Europe, by Country 
(percentages) 
Specific 
Former type Democratic Free national 
Country of socialism socialism Market solution 
Bulgaria 5.5 37.6 32.6 24.3 
Poland 2.8 38.3 35.4 23.5 
Russia 15.3 33.8 14.9 36.1 
Slovenia 4.0 46.4 34.6 15.0 
Czechoslovakia 2.8 35.5 35.6 26.1 
Estonia 2.3 37.0 17.4 43.3 
405 
N 
1185 
1454 
1265 
1143 
1111 
868 
Questionnaire item: There are many views about the future development of (country 
name, e.g. Polish) society. Which one of these alternatives comes closest to your own 
preference? 1) a socialist society along the lines of what we have already experienced 
in (country); 2) a more democratic type of socialism as found in some countries in 
the west; 3) a free· market economy which is essentially non·socialist as found in some 
other countries in the west; 4) a specific (country name, e.g. Polish) solution unique 
to the country. 
many of our findings that attitudes toward the economy and the role 
of the state in east central Europe were closer to those in western 
Europe and Japan than to the US. 
As we found earlier with the sources of support and opposition to 
socialist principles, the politically active segments of the population 
are much more supportive of a free-market future than the inactive_ 
Across all of the postcommunist states, a free-market solution was fa-
vored by 43 percent of the most politically active (4 or more types of 
political action), compared to just 25 percent of the large majority of 
respondents reporting no political actions_ In this latter group, by far 
the largest number (39%) favored a democratic socialist solution, fol-
lowed by 28 percent favoring a uniquely national solution_ 
It is also clear from our survey that young people provide the 
primary source of support for a free-market solution across postcom-
munist states_ Support for a free-market solution declines steadily from 
36 percent of those under 27 years of age to just 21 percent of those 
over 65, and this pattern holds for each of the countries individually 
as welL It is understandable that young people, more risk-taking, in-
dividualistic and westernized, would be more attracted to a free-market 
system that promised wealth to the ambitious and prosperity to the 
nation_ It is also understandable, however, that older people, more 
dependent on the state and more concerned about present-day eco-
nomic security than future riches, would be more reluctant to abandon 
totally the system of guarantees and benefits provided by the state_ 
The age differences on these issues raises the possibility of conflict 
between the generations on the future of these countries, with older 
people favoring a commitment.to some kind of socialism and the young 
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pressing for a more thoroughgoing market economy. On the other 
hand, it raises the possibility that, over time, an increasingly larger 
segment of the population will be brought over to the market alter· 
native, as older generations are replaced by younger, both in the so~ 
cieties at large and in the leaderships. The fact that the current lead· 
ership in these countries is rather young and that the politically active 
are more committed to the market means that in the short run, at least, 
the market approach will predominate. The question is, will this pre· 
dominance prevail as older segments of the population re·enter the 
political arena and as the toll of the market erodes support for capi· 
talism even among the young. 
In some countries, this turnaround seems to have begun already, 
with the electoral victories of postcommunist parties in Lithuania, Po· 
land and Hungary, for example. In the September 1993 elections in 
Poland, the victory of the parties on the left was due in part to the 
return to the electorate of people who had not voted in earlier elec-
tions. Of those who had not voted before, some 47 percent cast th~ir 
vote this time for parties on the left (22% for the SLD [Democratic 
Left Alliance], 15% for the PSL [Peasant Party] and 10% for the UP 
[Union of Labor]).30 This seems to confirm my assumptions in this 
paper that 1) those on the left (i.e., supporters of socialist principles) 
have not heretofore been very active politically; and 2) that when they 
re-enter the political arena, it is likely to result in different political 
constellations that may slow the pace of marketization and privatiza-
tion. In Poland, at least, the new governing alliance (of the SLD and 
PSL) promised to stay the course of economic reform, but the election 
results did send a signal of popular concern with the reform process 
that is bound to have an impact. 
This may be bad news for reformers and particularly those who 
favor a rapid transition to the market. But it is good news for the 
development and maturation of democratic institutions and values in 
the postcommunist states. For, without the inclusion of all segments 
of east central European populations in the political process, including 
those who are skeptical about the market and about capitalism, de-
mocracy will not succeed. 
30. "SLD zyskai u wszystkich," Rzeczpospolita, 21 September 1993. 
